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NOTES
The laws today which make such marriages void are foolish.
They render the relationship insecure, and are ineffective. They
have no real basis, for it has been proved that the bad heredity,
not the consanguinity of the parties, is the cause of ill effects
when they do follow. Perhaps in the future the law will not
forbid marriage on account of consanguinity. It will incorpo-
rate the principle that a marriage cannot be avoided on grounds
of consanguinity, but only because of proof of bad heredity (in
certain traits enumerated by the statute, such as deafness,
tuberculosis, etc.). And all marriages whether consanguineous
or not will be subject to such policy. It will insist that parties
to all marriages, not merely consanguineous, have a fairly good
ancestry. Or, in those cases where the heredity is poor, it will
provide for the sterilization of such unions. In short the laws
of marriage in the future will not be based on consanguinity,
but on the health and mentality of the parties entering them.
But without waiting for such a time, the laws making cousin-
marriages illegal, incestuous and void should be repealed. Such
marriages, at most, should be only voidable. In this way suc-
cessful unions could be allowed to exist legally, and not be in
danger of collateral attack after death. Unsuccessful marriages
could be voided at the suit of either party and possibly, of health
authorities of the state. The possibility that, due to double
heredity, there might be poor offspring could be provided for, as
indicated above, by special statute. Today we find the startling
situation of the majesty of the law forbidding marriage of two
healthy young people merely because, by accident of birth, they
are related, and allowing two congenitally deaf persons to marry
and produce progeny unfit to share the burdens of life!
RICHARD W. BROWN, '31.
STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS OF GUILT
The validity of statutory presumptions of guilt in criminal
prosecutions has long been a source of perplexing confusion and
a prolific basis of judicial conflict.' The root of attack lies in the
provisions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitu-
tion and their corresponding embodiment in state constitutions
and in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.
One of the most important legal presumptions is that of inno-
'As early as 1793, this type of statute was passed. "In all prosecutions
and suits, whether criminal or civil, against persons for cutting out, alter-
ing or destroying the marks of the owner upon any logs or lumber, the
possession of the logs or lumber by the accused shall be presumptive evi-
dence of his guilt, and the burden of proof thrown on him to discharge
himself." Mass. Laws (1793) c. 42, sec. 6.
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cence. It is known in legal phraseology as "giving the benefit
of doubt to the accused," and is so cogent that it cannot be re-
pelled by any evidence short of what is sufficient to establish the
fact of criminality with moral certainty.2 The Fifth Amend-
ment provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; the Sixth Amendment, that
in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the state and
district where the crime shall have been committed, which dis-
trict shall have been previously ascertained by law. Again, the
Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall deprive
any person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. It has been contended that presumption-
of-guilt statutes have taken away from the jury the right to de-
termine the weight of evidence for themselves; that by depriv-
ing the accused of the common law presumption of innocence
they curtail the right of jury trial; that presumption is substi-
tuted for actual proof of venue; and finally that the accused is
deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of
law and is denied that equal protection of law guaranteed to all
persons.
In the light of recent Supreme Court decisions, there are three
types of presumptive-evidence statutes: (1) those which create
a conclusive presumption of fact; (2) those which create a re-
buttable presumption of fact, which presumption is merely tem-
porary in nature and vanishes upon the introduction of oppos-
ing testimony; and (3) those presumptions which fall in cate-
gory (2) except that they are given the effect of evidence to be
weighed against opposing testimony and to prevail unless de-
fense testimony is found by the jury to preponderate. In so far
as presumptive-evidence statutes have been upheld they are in
the form of a declaration that certain facts shall be prima facie
evidence of another fact, as contrasted with those statutes which
create conclusive presumptions and thereby deny to the accused
any right of explanation or rebuttal.3 The difficulty lies in de-
termining whether constitutional prohibitions are invaded by
statutes falling within the second and third categories, above.
I1 Taylor, EVIDENCE, sec. 112; Starkde, EVIDENCE (4th ed.) 817; Green-
leaf, EVIDENCE, sec. 13A; Coffin v. U. S. (1895) 156 U. S. 432, 453; Coch-
rane & Sayre v. U. S. (1895) 157 U. S. 286, 298; Davis v. U. S. (1895) 160
U. S. 469.3 Notes to Cases (1906) 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1009. Mobile, J. & K. C. R.
Co. v. Turnipseed (1910) 219 U. S. 35; In re Opinion of Justices (1911) 208
Mass. 619, 94 N. E. 1044; Darbyshire v. State (1925) 196 Ind. 608, 149 N.
E. 166; Hawes v. Georgia (1922) 258 U. S. 1, 4.
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As to a general classification, the case of People v. Cannon4
enunciates the almost universally accepted doctrine: "It may be
said that the general accepted limitations upon a legislative
body have been that the fact upon which the presumption is to
rest must have some fair relation to, or natural connection with,
the main fact. The inference of the existence of the main fact,
because of the existence of the fact actually proved, must not
be arbitrary or wholly unreasonable, immaterial, or extra-
ordinary; and the accused must have in each case a fair oppor-
tunity to make his defense and to submit the whole case to the
jury to be decided by that body." Mere legislative fiat may not
take the place of fact in the determination of issues involving
life, liberty or property.5
This line of distinction seems clear in its essence and is the
only one which need be applied in passing upon the validity of
statutes falling within category (2), but its application to par-
ticular statutes involving particular circumstances has led to a
wide diversity of judicial decisions. Perhaps no better illustra-
tion can be found than in two recent Supreme Court decisions in-
volving the constitutionality of so-called 'presumptive-evidence'
statutes. In the case of Casey v. United States6 a conviction was
sustained under the provisions of the Harrison Anti-Narcotic
Act. That statute provides that it shall be unlawful for any per-
son to purchase, sell or dispense drugs except in the original
stamped packages, and that the absence of the required stamps
shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of this section by the
person in whose possession the same might be found. In the
instant case conviction for purchase was sustained upon the
mere fact of possession alone in spite of a noteworthy absence
of any proof of purchase whatsoever. This conclusion was
reached by the court on the basis that there was a rational con-
nection between the fact presumed and the fact actually proved.
On the other hand, in the case of Manley v. State of Georgia,7 a
statute providing that every insolvency of a bank shall be deemed
fraudulent, reserving to the defendant the right to repel such
presumption by showing that the affairs of the bank had been
fairly and legally administered, was declared unconstitutional
as being arbitrary and violative of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In the former case, by a divided court,
' (1893) 139 N. Y. 32, 34 N. E. 759; Cockrill v. California (1925) 268
U. S. 258.
'McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Co. (1916) 241 U. S. 79.
* (1928) 276 U. S. 414; Anti-Narcotic Act, 26 U. S. C., sec. 692, par. 1;
Act of Dec. 17, 1914, c. 1 as amended by Act of Feb. 24, 1919, c. 18, sec. 1006.
' (1929) 49 S. Ct. 215, Adv. op. 232. See Ga. State Banking Act, art.
20, see. 28.
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the rule of rationality between proved and presumed facts was
held to be satisfied, while in the latter case, the court was unan-
imous in declaring that the connection between the two facts
was insufficient, in that reasoning does not lead from one to the
other and that the presumption created was therefore wholly
arbitrary. An adequate definition of a rational connection be-
comes almost impossible under these apparently conflicting
decisions.
In approaching the problem with reference to statutes in cate-
gory (3), the same difficulty of reconciliation between proved
and presumed facts appears, and there is the additional necessity
of distinguishing between those statutes which merely create a
temporary inference of fact that disappears upon the introduc-
tion of opposing testimony and those statutes where the pre-
sumption remains until the close of the trial and must be weighed
with all other evidence in the determination of the innocence or
guilt of the accused party. The case of Western Atlantic R. R.
v. Henderson8 illustrates the fine-cut distinctions which are
made in the determination of the validity of such statutes. A
Georgia statute provided that railroad companies should be liable
for any damage done to persons, stock, or other property by the
running of locomotives or cars or other machinery of such com-
pany, or for damage done by any person in the employment and
service of such company, unless the company should make it
appear that its agents had exercised all ordinary care and dili-
gence, the presumption in all cases being against the company.
The plaintiff's husband had been killed at a railroad crossing
and this statute was relied upon as an essential part of her case.
It was held that the mere fact of collision furnished no basis for
any inference as to whether the accident was caused by negli-
gence of the railroad company and that under the statute, prop-
erly interpreted, such presumption fell within category (3)
above. Hence the court held it to be violative of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Compare this decision
with that of Mobile, J. & K. C. R. R. v. Turnipseed rendered in
1910.9 A Mississippi statute provided that in all actions against
railroad companies for damages done to persons or property,
proof of injury inflicted by the running of locomotives or cars of
such company shall be prima facie evidence of the want of
reasonable care and skill on the part of the servants of the com-
pany in reference to the injury. The similarity of this statute
with the above-quoted Georgia statute is to be noted, yet in an
action for the death of a section foreman due to the derailment
- (1929) 279 U. S. 639.
' Above, n. 3.
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of cars the validity of the statute was upheld upon the basis that
there was a rational connection between the proved and pre-
sumed facts and that the statute merely created a temporary
inference of fact which vanished upon the introduction of op-
posing evidence. The Western & Atlantic R. R. decision makes
it doubtful if the same result would have been reached today.
Hence the outcome of future decisions is doubtful; but it seems
certain that a much clearer connection between presumed and
proved facts is to be required and that there must be only a
temporary presumption, causing the statute to fall within cate-
gory (2).
Legislation involving presumptive-evidence statutes has not
been limited to the states. Congress, in regulating the sale of
narcotics and providing for the punishment of counterfeiting
has made use of the same device.
Convictions under the anti-narcotic laws have been repeatedly
upheld.10 A similar situation exists under the counterfeiting
laws.- However, in actions for purchase under the anti-narcotic
laws, convictions have been repeatedly reversed for failure to
prove venue. Illustrative of this type of case is Brightman
v. United States'- where the court in denying the validity
of presumptive-evidence statutes in regard to venue held that
venue is a distindt and independent matter which must be both
alleged and proved and that common experience does not sup-
port a presumption that the mere fact of possession indicates
the place of purchase. This rational conclusion was entirely
ignored in the case of Casey v. United States.
Authorities are not lacking in support of the validity of prima
facie evidence statutes. Thus the court has upheld the validity
" United States v. Ah Hung (1917) 243 F. 762, under Act Jan. 17, 1914,
c. 9, sec. 2, 38 Stat. 275 (Comp. Stat. 1916) sec. 8801, providing that im-
portation of opium shall be unlawful. Sec. 3. Smoking opium found after
July 1, 1913, shall be presumed to have been imported after April 1, 1909,
and the burden of proof is on the accused to rebut the presumption. Gee
Woe v. United States (C. C. A. 5, 1918) 250 F. 428, 162 C. C. A. 498; U. S.
v. Yee Fing (D. C. 1915) 222 F. 154. Presumptions are but rules of evi-
dence and not substantive law creating offenses, and do not deprive the
jury of its function of weighing evidence and determining facts. Fiunkin
v. U. S. (1920) 265 F. 1; Dean v. U. S. (1920) 266 F. 694; Pierriero v.
U. S. (1921) 271 F. 912; James v. U. S. (1922) 279 F. 111; Brain v. U. S.
(1922) 282 F. 271; Willsman v. U. S. (C. C. A. 8, 1923) 286 F. 852, holding
that possession to be incriminating must be personal and exclusive, but the
possession of a confederate or partner in the business of unlawfully
selling narcotics would be the possession of the defendant.
IBaender v. United States (C. C. A. 9, 1919) 260 F. 832, 171 C. C. A.558.5 (1925) 7 F. (2d) 532; Cain v. U. S. (1926) 12 F. (2d) 580; De Moss
v. United States (1926) 14 F. (2d) 1021.
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of a statute providing that when any apparatus used for the
manufacture of intoxicating liquors is found upon premises, the
same shall be prima facie evidence that the person in actual
possession of the premises has knowledge of its existence.", A
statute making the destruction of fluids to prevent seizure prima
facie evidence that the fluids were intoxicating liquids intended
for unlawful purposes was held to be valid.14 A similar con-
clusion was reached for the possession of burglar tools's and of
gambling implements located in any house.o It has been held
competent for the legislature to provide that the possession of
intoxicating liquors in certain cases shall be taken as prima facie
evidence of intent to sell.17 The same principles have been ap-
plied in relation to the possession of game out of season;18 to
the possession of stolen property as prima facie evidence of
larceny; 19 and to a statute providing that involuntary liquidation
of a bank within thirty days after receiving a deposit shall be
prima facie evidence of intent to defraud on the part of the offi-
cers.20 Likewise, statutes declaring that the possession of policy
slips by a person other than a public officer is presumptive of pos-
session knowingly in violation of law have been held to be valid
and not violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 1 In all of these cases the distinction introduced by
the Western & Atlantic R. R. case, between statutes in categories
(2) and (3) above, was ignored as it was in the Turnipseed case.
The power of legislatures to create presumptive rules of evi-
dence is no longer questioned. As stated by Cooley, "There is
no provision of our Constitution that expressly prohibits this
exercise of legislative power as to rules of evidence, nor do we
Hawes v. Georgia (1922) 258 U. S. 1.1 1Roberts v. People (1926) 78 Colo. 555, 243 Pac. 544.
State v. Fitspatric (1927) 141 Wash. 638, 251 Pac. 8'?5.
"'Wooten v. State (1898) 24 Fla. 335, 5 So. 39.
1 State v. Cunningham (1856) 25 Conn. 195; State v. Morgan (1873)
40 Conn. 44; Commonwealth v. Williams (Mass. 1856) 6 Gray 1; Edwards
v. State (1889) 121 Ind. 450; State v. Hurley (1867) 54 Me. 562; Common-
wealth v. Wallace (Mass. 1856) 7 Gray 222. Cf. State v. Beswick (1880)
13 R. I. 211, holding that a statute providing that the notorious character
of premises and persons frequenting them shall be prima facie evidence
that liquors are being sold there is unconstitutional.
IPeople v. Williams (1916) 61 Colo. 11, 155 Pac. 323; People v. Martin
(1908) 123 App. Div. 335, 107 N. Y. S. 1076; State v. Stone (1898) 20
R. 1.-559, 40 Atl. 499.
' State v. Potello (1911) 40 Utah 56, 119 Pac. 1023.
" State v. Beach (1896) f47 Ind. 74, 43 N. E. 949; Ramsey Petroleum Co.
v. Adams (1925) 119 Kan. 844, 241 Pac. 433; State v. Buck (1894) 120
Mo. 479, 25 S. W. 573; Robertson v. People (1894) 20 Colo. 279, 38 Tac. 326.
'Adams v. New York (1904) 192 U. S. 585.
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know of anyone that is violated in its necessary implications by
such an exercise of legislative power. We cannot declare a
statute void simply because it may in our opinion be opposed to a
spirit supposed to pervade the Constitution, or because we may
think it unjust, unwise or impolitic. ' ' 22 Wigmore does not feel
that the Constitution imposes any such limitation as the Su-
preme Court has imposed upon state legislation. He says: "A
rule of presumption is simply a rule changing the burden of
proof, i. e., declaring that the main fact will be inferred or as-
sumed from some other fact until evidence to the contrary is
introduced. There is not the least doubt on principle that the
legislature has entire control over such rules, as it has over all
other rules of procedure in general and evidence in particular,
subject only to the limitations of evidence enshrined in the Con-
stitution. Yet this elementary truth has been repeatedly ques-
tioned, and the courts have repeatedly vouchsafed an unmerited
attention to the question, chiefly through a hesitation in appre-
ciating the true nature of a presumption and a tendency to asso-
ciate in some indefinite manner the notion of conclusively shut-
ting out all evidence and that of merely shifting the duty of
producing it. '23
The obvious difficulty in reconciling the results reached in
Caaey v. United States,2' Manley v. State of Georgia,25 Mobile,
J. & K. C. R. R. v. Turnipseed28 and Western & Atlantic R. R. v.
Henderson 2 constitutes a strong argument in support of abandon-
ing the rule requiring a rational connection between proved and
presumed facts. It is clear that decisions under one presumption
cannot be used as precedents involving another. Prima facie
statutes should be interpreted as merely demanding explanation
by the party against whom the presumption operates and thereby
as in no manner usurping the functions of a jury and violating
constitutional safeguards and prohibitions.
CASPAR R. STAUFFACHER, '30.
n Cooley, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS; (5th ed.) 199, 202, 205.
" 2 Wigmore, EViDENCE (2d ed. 1923), secs. 1354, 1356.
Above, n. 6.
"Above, n. 7.
Above, n. 3.
"Above, n. 8.
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